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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONFESSION
SOLICITED WITHOUT NOTIFYING APPOINTED
COUNSEL HELD ADMISSIBLE
T HOUGH recent Supreme Court decisions considering the admissi-
bility of pre-trial, inculpatory statements made by an accused in
the absence of counsel have emphasized the desiderative interrelation
of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth
amendment right to counsel,' the role to be afforded retained or ap-
pointed counsel in a waiver of these rights is not yet clear. William J.
Coughlan, a nineteen-year-old indigent, was arrested for aiding and abetting
in the robbery of a federally insured bank.2 An agent of the F.B.I. advised
Coughlan of his "Miranda rights" 3 and attempted to question him, but
Coughlan indicated that he did not wish to make a statement. At the
next day's arraignment, counsel was appointed by a United States Com-
missioner. Later, while in jail awaiting trial, Coughlan was brought
before the same F.B.I. agent and two other investigators; the Miranda
warning was repeated; and Coughlan consented to an interview, though
refusing to sign a waiver form. The interviewers, aware that counsel had
been appointed, made no effort to notify him of the impending interroga-
tion, and he was not present. Coughlan's non-jury trial resulted in con-
viction largely because of the admission, over objection, of an inculpatory
statement made during the second interrogation. Claiming that he had
been effectively denied his sixth amendment right to counsel, Coughlan
appealed. Over the strong dissent of Judge Hamley, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, relying upon the district court's finding of waiver,
affirmed the conviction per curiam.4
The fifth amendment privilege to remain silent "in any criminal case"
becomes a hollow guarantee if, prior to trial, an accused incriminates
'See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Developments in the
Law-Confessions, 79 HAv. L. RBv. 935 (1966); Comment, The New Definition: A
Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel, 14 U.C.L.A.L. RE,. 604, 607-10 (1967); Note,
The Curious Confusion Surrounding Escobedo v. Illinois, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 560, 570,
579, & n.88 (1965); cf. People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 169, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965); Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal
Procedure, 70 IA~v. L. REv. 1, 8 (1956).
Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968).
'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 467-74, 478-79 (1966).
'391 F.2d at 372.
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himself due to ignorance of the guarantee, lack of comprehension as to
the import of the right, or subjection to physical or psychological coercion.5
Similarly, denial of counsel during the investigatory stages of the criminal
process seriously hampers efficacious adversary representation," since,
to as large a degree as is ethically and practically possible, counsel shapes
the evidence police obtain.7 The Supreme Court has endeavored to assure
the marriage of the fifth and sixth amendments by expanding the con-
cept of "criminal case" 8 and "criminal prosecution" 9 to include post-
indictment, 10 and later pre-indictment," and "custodial interrogation. 1 2
'Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (physical coercion); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (deceit); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959) (psychological coercion); Walker v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275 (1941) (same);
Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (ignorance); Hancock v. White, 378
F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1967) (same); see notes 43-45 infra and accompanying text.
'Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (counsel needed to safeguard
possible defense); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (counsel needed to
alleviate defendant's lack of knowledge and skill); Ricks v. United States, 334 F.2d
964, 965-71 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (danger of absence of counsel demonstrated by chain
of events).
'See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
8 U.S. CONST., amend. V.
9 U.S. CONST., amend. VI.
11 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315 (1959); see The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HlAv. L. REV. 143, 217 (1964);
cf. Hancock v. White, 378 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1967); People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d
561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961). Subsequent decisions indicate that
courts disagree as to the basis of the holding in Massiah. Compare Hancock v. White,
378 F.2d 479, 481-82 (1st Cir. 1967); Beatty v. United States, 377 F.2d 181, 188-91
(5th Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 45 (1967), and McLeod v. Ohio, 173 Ohio St.
520, 184 N.E.2d 101 (1962), conviction aft'd, 1 Ohio St. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 349
(1964), rev'd per curiam, 381 U.S. 356 (1965), with United States v. Garcia, 377
F.2d 321, 324 (2d Cir. 1967); Gascar v. United States, 356 F.2d 101, 102-03 (9th Cir.
1965); United States v. Gardner, 347 F.2d 405, 408 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 1015 (1966), and United States v. Accardi, 342 F.2d 697, 701 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 954 (1965). See also United States v. Edwards, 366 F.2d 853,
872-73 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 908 (1967); Stowers v. United States,
351 F.2d 301, 302 (9th Cir. 1965).
u Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
'
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see Grahm, What Is "Custodial
Interrogation?": California's Anticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 59, 78-117, 132-33 (1966); 18 WESTEmN RESERVE L. REV. 1777
(1967).
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Under Escobedo v. Illinois's and Miranda v. Arizona,14 therefore, both
rights arise at the moment the investigation begins to "focus" on the ac-
cused' 85 or when he is taken into custody.16 As was stated recently in
United States v. Wade,17 which extended the right to counsel to the post-
indictment lineup as a "critical stage" in the criminal process,18 the Court
intends to "scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to deter-
mine whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the
defendant's basic right to a fair trial ... ." 19 In order to protect against
the pressures inherent in an investigation, the Miranda Court prescribed
that every custodial interrogation must be preceded by a comprehensive
warning of fifth and sixth amendment rights, in the absence of which
evidence obtained will be inadmissible in any future trial.20 Similarly, in
Wade, the Court ruled that a courtroom identification, "tainted" by a pre-
trial lineup in the absence of engaged counsel, was inadmissible.21 The
Miranda and Wade exclusionary rules contain a significant limitation,
however; an accused may waive his fifth and sixth amendment rights if
done "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." 22
-378 U.S. 478 (1964); see Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v.
United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 Mn-N. L. REv. 47 (1964); The Supreme
Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARv. L. Rnv. 143, 217 (1964); Comment, Linkletter, Shott,
and the Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo, 64 Micr. L. Rnv. 832 (1966); Comment,
The Curious Confusion Surrounding Escobedo v. Illinois, 32 U. Cm. L. Rn'v. 560
(1965). See also Rothblatt, Police Interrogation and the Right to Counsel, Post
Escobedo v. Illinois: Application v. Emasculation, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 41 (1965).
1384 U.S. 436 (1966); see Elsen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect under
Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. Rav. 645 (1967); Kamisar, A Dissent from the
Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old
"Voluntariness" Test, 65 Micr. L. REv. 59 (1966); The Supreme Court, 1965 Term,
80 HARv. L. Rav. 91, 201 (1966); Note, Consent Searches; A Reappraisal After
Miranda v. Arizona, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 130 (1967).
378 U.S. at 490-91.
384 U.S. at 444 & n.4.
1388 U.S. 218 (1967).
18 388 U.S. at 227-39; see, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (interro-
gation period was a "most critical" stage for the defendant); Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1961) (arraignment was "critical stage" under applicable state
law); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932) (from arraignment until trial was
a "critical period" in the proceedings).
388 U.S. at 227 (emphasis in original).
-'384 U.S. at 444-45, 467-73, 476, 478-79.
-1388 U.S. at 223-24, 228-39, 241 (1967); see Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263, 272-73 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297, 299 (1967).
1384 U.S. at 444, 475-76, 479; 388 U.S. at 237.
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Subject to the provisos that the court is to "indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental rights," 23 and that waiver
is not to be presumed from silence by the accused,24 determination of
a "knowing and intelligent" waiver has traditionally been the province
of the trial court.25 While expressly endorsing these standards, the
Miranda majority went significantly further, placing the burden of demon-
strating a valid waiver on the Government.26 However, neither Miranda
nor Wade particularized the elements of a "knowing and intelligent
waiver." Language in Fay v. Noia 2 7 that there can be no waiver unless
there exists a "considered choice" by the petitioner suggests that a true
waiver involves more than mere acquiescence, requiring instead an affirma-
tive decision by the accused, arrived at with knowledge of the available
right and through an understanding of the various ramifications of waiver
and non-waiver.2 8 The degree of legal sophistication necessary to accom-
modate the Nola comprehension test and the Miranda intelligence stand-
ard would seemingly dictate access to the advice, if not the actual presence,
of engaged counsel whenever an accused is confronted with the waiver
option.2 9 Indeed, one circuit court has predicated in dictum that Miranda
I Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942); accord, Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
2'Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1962); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 70-72 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938); United
States v. Slaughter, 366 F.2d 833, 840-41 (4th Cir. 1966).
'See e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938); Symposium: Admin-
istration of Criminal Justice, 26 LA. L. REv. 666, 694 (1966); Comment, Waiver of
Constitutional Rights by Counsel in a Criminal Proceeding, 1 J. MARSHALL J. 93, 97
(1967).
' Compare 384 U.S. at 475, with Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938)
(burden on defendant in a habeas corpus proceeding), and Spanbauer v. Burke, 374
F.2d 67, 74-75 (7th Cir. 1966) cert. denied, 389 U.S. 861 (1967) (burden of showing
non-waiver not met by accused).
"372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963); see Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513-17
(1962); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 162-65 (1957).
See Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 159 (1957) (must be "intelligently
waived"); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 727 (1948) (must be waived "com-
petently, intelligently, and with full understanding of the implications"); Maldonado
v. Eyman, 377 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1967) (waiver must be "intelligent choice" of
the defendant); Wade v. Yeager, 377 F.2d 841, 846 (3d Cir. 1967) (waiver must be
"deliberate choice" by client and counsel); Meadows v. Maxwell, 371 F.2d 664, 668
(6th Cir. 1967) (counsel should have been appointed to assure that defendant under-
stood his rights); Day v. United States, 357 F.2d 907, 909-11 (7th Cir. 1966) (court
inquiry as to intelligent and intentional waiver mandatory despite defendant's extensive
criminal history); United States v. Curtiss, 330 F.2d 278, 279-81 (2d Cir. 1964)
(waiver must be preceded by clear-cut explanation of rights).
I See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 282 (1942)
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prohibits ex parte interrogation where counsel has been appointed or
retained.s0
While noting that the "better, fairer, and safer practice is to afford
the defendant's attorney reasonable opportunity to be present," the Ninth
Circuit in CoughIan was concerned that a reversal of Coughlan's convic-
tion would signify that custodial interrogations must be attended by en-
gaged counsel and was unwilling to so "expand" Miranda.81 Instead,
the court searched the record for a "clear and knowing" waiver and,
satisfied that the prosecution had met the burden of demonstrating such
a waiver, affirmed the conviction.8 2 The dissent contended that a special
exception to the Miranda waiver rule had been created by the failure
of investigating authorities to notify appointed counsel.8 3 By failing to
inform defense counsel of the intended interview and thereby foreclosing
his opportunity to be present, the investigators had as effectively denied
Coughlan his constitutional and statutory34 guarantees of the assistance
of counsel as if they had barred counsel from the jail, the dissent main-
tained. 5 Thus, without the advice and presence of counsel, Coughlan's
waiver did not meet the "voluntary, knowing and intelligent" standard
of Miranda.0 Further, as Judge Hamley observed, the practice of the
prosecutor of dealing directly with a represented defendant through the
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (under the circumstances, waiver without the advice of
counsel was not "intelligent and competent"); Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863,
869 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (incapable of intelligent waiver without advice of counsel);
Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v.
Illinois, 49 MINN. L. Rv. 47, 55, 64, 66, 69 (1964); 16 BurNAIo L. 11Ev. 439, 447-48
(1967).
1 Mathies v. United States, 374 F.2d 312, 316 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see Misner v.
United States, 384 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1967) (semble); United States v. Smith,
379 F.2d 628, 633-34 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 389 U.S. 993 (1967); Jones v. United
States, 342 F.2d 863, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d 770, 777
(5th Cir. 1963). See Bator, Criminal Justice in the Mid-Sixties: Escobedo Revisited,
42 F.R.D. 463, 472 (1966).
3" 391 F.2d at 372.
I21d. See notes 22-26 supra and accompanying text.
391 F.2d at 372, 374 & nn.2-3 (Hamley, J., dissenting).
'Criminal Justice Act of 1964 § 2, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (1964) ("A defendant
for whom counsel is appointed shall be represented at every stage of the proceed-
ings ... ."); FED. R. CRM. P. 5 & 44(a); see Ray v. United States, 367 F.2d 258,
264-65 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 913 (1967).
391 F.2d at 375 (Hamley, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 374-75 (Hamley, J., dissenting); see notes 22-30 supra and accom-
panying text; cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-91 (1964); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204-05 (1964); Comment, Criminal Waiver: The
Requirements of Personal Participation, Competence and Legitimate State Interest,
54 CALw. L. REV. 1262, 1270, 1295-96 (1966).
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medium of "government agents" is violative of Canon 9 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics.37 By admitting Coughlan's statement, the majority
was, in effect, encouraging future unethical prosecutorial conduct.88
The majority's reliance upon the lower court's determination of
waiver is consistent with the explicit waiver provisions of Miranda and
Wade.39 Arguably, however, the decision betrays the spirit of these cases
and their predecessors, 40 disregards the fundamental interdependency of
the fifth and sixth amendments, and dilutes the scope and import of the
right to counsel. Moreover, in light of the undesirable policy being
fostered by the Coughlan opinion, the majority's refusal to incorporate
an exception to the Miranda waiver doctrine in those instances where
counsel has been retained or appointed would appear to be overly cautious.
Instead of requiring investigatory bodies to cooperate with defense counsel
in the hope of forging a viable, pretrial role for counsel commensurate with
both the rights of the accused and the legitimate needs of law enforcement
agencies,41 the Ninth Circuit has suggested that governments may avoid
the dampening effect of defense counsel by dealing directly with the
defendant.4 The Miranda Court sought to eliminate disparate judicial
treatment of the informed and the naive by providing all suspects with
a comprehensive warning of the sixth amendment right to counsel at
the critical investigatory stage. It seems unlikely that the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel would have been required at the investigatory stage
if a perfunctory warning of the right to remain silent alone were sufficient
to assure that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination did
' 391 F.2d at 376; ABA CANONS OF PROFEssIoNAL ETmcs No. 9; accord, Mathies
v. United States, 374 F.2d 312, 316-17 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Jones v. United States, 342
F.2d 863, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Ricks v. United States, 334 F.2d 964, 970 & n.18
(D.C. Cir. 1964); Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d 770, 777 (5th Cir. 1963); see
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487 n.7 (1964). But see United States v. Smith,
379 F.2d 628, 633 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 66
(2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). See generally H.
DRINKER, LEGAL ETmIcs 201-02 (1953); Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States, A
Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. Rnv. 483, 599-604 (1963).
Were interrogation of an accused to be classified as a "deposition," FMn. R.
Cm. P. 15 could be invoked to require the presence of counsel for all parties at the
investigation. 391 F.2d at 378 n.11 (Hamley, J., dissenting); Ricks v. United States,
334 F.2d 964, 969-70 & nn.15, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
"See notes 22-26 supra and accompanying text.
0See 391 F.2d at 374 (Hamley, I., dissenting); notes 1 & 5-21 supra and
accompanying text.
'Comment, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police
Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J 1000, 1049-50 (1964).
'aBut see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237-38 (1967).
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not become illusory.4 Indeed, the identical factors, 44 such as nervous-
ness, lack of comprehension as to the need for exercising the right, and
psychological pressure, which induce a suspect to incriminate himself,
despite a warning of the right to remain silent, could act to convince
an accused to waive his right to the presence of counsel already engaged. 45
Knowing this, police might be persuaded to repeatedly isolate a defendant
prior to trial, using clandestine custodial interrogations to elicit the desired
inculpatory statement. Should that practice occur, the buffer between
the state and the individual which counsel is designed to provide 4 is
eliminated; and the impressionable, the ignorant, and the uninitiated
would again be subjected to unequal judicial treatment. Finally, as is
suggested by the analogous factual situation in Wade, where appointed
counsel was not notified of his client's participation in a post-indictment
lineup, the effective denial of access to engaged counsel resulting from
solicitation of a waiver in counsers absence may be a denial of due process
that sabotages the defendant's right to a fair trial. 47 Such an analysis
is strengthened by the Canon 9 proscription against "communication upon
the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel." 48
The dissent in Coughlan does not conclude whether "timely noti-
fication" of appointed counsel would be satisfactory, or whether counsel
must actually be present before an interrogation can take place. Man-
datory presence of counsel, however, would probably offer too great an
opportunity for tactical delay, while mere notification could be readily
abused by law enforcement agencies. Thus, where counsel has been
retained or appointed, the proper test might be timely notification and
"See Broeder, supra note 37, at 521-22; Schwartz, Criminal Justice in the Mid-
Sixties: Escobedo Revisited, 42 F.R.D. 463, 469 (1966); Note, 78 HAav. L. Rav. 426,
429 (1964) (perfunctory warning in conjunction with police authority may induce
incriminating statements).
"See Faculty Note, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft
Protestors, 77 YALE L.. 300, 312-18 (1967).
"See Faculty Note, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft
Protestors, 77 YALE L.J. 300, 310-19 (1967); Comment, An Historical Argument for
the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1048 (1964);
The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HAav. L. REv. 143, 219 & n.11, 220 (1964).
'Comment, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police
Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1034, 1048 (1964).
'
TUnited States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223-24 (1967); see Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293, 297-99 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 279 (1967) (Black,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); note 19 supra and accompanying text.
"ABA CANONS Or PRoFEsSIoNAL Ermcs No. 9; Broeder, supra note 37, at 604
(author suggests that Canon 9 violation by prosecutor or his agents is a denial of
right to counsel and due process).
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reasonable opportunity to be present. Requiring that counsel be apprised
of an impending interrogation is not to foreclose waiver of constitutional
guarantees. Rather, such a procedural safeguard would tend to ensure
that a waiver was entered into freely and with cognizance of the alter-
natives and ramifications.4"
"See Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 Hixv. L. REv. 935, 1020
(1966); Comment, The New Definition: A Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel, 14
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 604, 618, 623, 627 (1967).
In Hodge v. United States,---F.2d- (9th Cir. 1968), decided after Coughlan,
the Ninth Circuit appeared to apply a more stringent standard in waiver cases, at
least as to waiver of counsel at trial, requiring the trial court to conduct a "penetrating
and comprehensive examination" in order to assure that the accused was adequately
informed of the risks involved in the waiver of constitutional guarantees. Id. at-.
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